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Thursday, July 30, 2020 | History

2 edition of Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors? found in the catalog.

Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors?

Joshua Aizenman

Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors?

by Joshua Aizenman

  • 172 Want to read
  • 37 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Debts, External -- Law and legislation.,
  • Loans, Foreign -- Law and legislation.,
  • Bank reserves -- Law and legislation.,
  • Default (Finance),
  • Deposit insurance -- Law and legislation.,
  • Saving and investment -- United States.,
  • Labor supply -- United States.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementJoshua Aizenman, Stephen J. Turnovsky.
    SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 7004, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7004.
    ContributionsTurnovsky, Stephen J., National Bureau of Economic Research.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 7004
    The Physical Object
    Pagination34 p. :
    Number of Pages34
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL22399991M

    Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard - on Debtors or Creditors? The Economic Journal, Vol. , pp. , Number of . Bad Debt Reserve. A bad debt reserve is the amount that companies set aside to cover uncollectible receivables, notes or loans. Companies typically look at the past payment history of its customers and the ease or difficulty of collecting payments and use the average number or percentage to set their bad debt reserve.

    The substantive chapters of the bankruptcy code seek either rehabilitation or liquidation. Chapters 11 and 13 seek rehabilitation. These chapters hold creditors at bay while the debtor develops a payment plan. In return for retaining some assets, debtors usually promise to pay creditors a portion of future earnings.   Graph and download economic data for Federal Debt Held by Federal Reserve Banks (FDHBFRBN) from Q1 to Q1 about federal, debt, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

    sovereign debtors would be barred from paying consenting creditors their renegotiated (reduced) claims without also paying holdout creditors their original (full) claims.3 If 1Sovereign Debt: Hold-Outs Upheld, The Economist, Nov. 3, 2Older bonds contain clauses that make it di¢ cult to change payment terms for all creditors by majority. The European debt crisis (often also referred to as the eurozone crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis) is a multi-year debt crisis that has been taking place in the European Union since the end of Several eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks under their.


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Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors? by Joshua Aizenman Download PDF EPUB FB2

This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications by: Downloadable. This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur) and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium degree of default risk and borrowing are analyzed. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur), and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on ®nancial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications discussed.

Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard-- on Debtors or Creditors. Article in The Economic Journal (). RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON SOVEREIGN DEBT IN THE PRESENCE OF MORAL HAZARD – ON DEBTORS OR CREDITORS?* Joshua Aizenman and Stephen J. Turnovsky This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of WashingtonDepartment of Economics at the University of Washington. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky,   Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors.

Economic Journal, pp.January Posted: 19 Apr Abstract. This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur), and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of. This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur) and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

The impacts of such reserve Cited by: RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON SOVEREIGN DEBT IN THE PRESENCE OF MORAL HAZARD - ON DEBTORS OR CREDITORS?* Joshua Aizenman and Stephen J. Turnovsky This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side.

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.

Get this from a library. Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard: on debtors or creditors?. [Joshua Aizenman; Stephen J Turnovsky; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will.

Get this from a library. Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors?. [Joshua Aizenman; Stephen J Turnovsky; National Bureau of.

This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side. Aizenman, J. and S.J. Turnovsky (), “Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard – on debtors or creditors?” Economic Journal, (), – Aizenman, J., M.

Hutchison and Y. Jinjarak (), “What is the risk of European sovereign debt. The bad debt reserve is a provision for the estimated amount of bad debt that is likely to arise from existing accounts receivable.A large reserve may be caused by low-quality customers, which may in turn be caused by a company's reduced attention to screening the financial condition of prospectivea large bad debt reserve is ultimately caused by inattention to the corporate.

sovereign debt can make them especially difficult to resolve. When a sovereign debt crisis occurs, or seems imminent, the international community has been faced with the unpalatable choice between large bailouts (Mexico ) or chaotic default (Russia ).

The lack of a clear and predictable framework may also discourage debtors from. by the sovereign, its creditors, and the official sector to pursue a restructuring, other than in the most extreme circumstances.

This, in turn, increases the likely magnitude of the loss of asset values, which is harmful to the interests of both debtors and creditors.

During the s debt. Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors? by Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky; The composition of government expenditure and its consequences for macroeconomic performance by Turnovsky, Stephen J. & Fisher, Walter H.

Investment tax credit in an open economy by Sen, Partha & Turnovsky.Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard - on Debtors or Creditors? S.J. Turnovsky, J. Aizenman. págs. Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange.

C. Syropoulos, S. Skaperdas. págs. Emotional Hazard in a .TDRs are defined under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as concessions that creditors would otherwise not consider granting to debtors due to economic or legal reasons related to the debtors’ financial difficulties.

Creditors restructure troubled debts to improve loan performance and reduce credit risk.